We analyze strategic …rm behavior in settings where the production stage is followed by several periods during which only sales take place. We analyze the dynamics of the market structure, the development of prices and sales over time, and the implications for pro…ts and consumer surplus. Two speci…c settings are analyzed. In the …rst, a …rm can commit up-front to a sales strategy that does not depend on the actual sales of its competitor. In this case there is a unique Nash equilibrium and price increases over time. In the second setting, there is no commitment and …rms can adjust their sales in response to observed supply of their competitor in the previous period. It is shown that in this case a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does not always exist. Equilibria can have surprising features. For some parameter constellations, price may decrease over time. It is also possible that the …rm increases its pro…t by destroying some of its production. When …rms have equal size, the equilibrium outcome is the same in both the commitment and the non-commitment setting. In general, the setting without commitment is bene…cial to the larger …rm, whereas the setting with commitment leads to higher pro…ts for the smaller …rm.
Introduction
In most models of dynamic duopoly, it is assumed that production is instantly adjusted to per-period demand. However, in many real-world applications, this is not the case. Take, for instance, an airplane company that is selling seats on a ‡ight, scheduled to take o¤ in a month from now. In the plane, the number of seats is …xed, and is not adjusted to the realized demand. Seats are sold at several moments in time, until the month has elapsed. To maximize pro…ts, the company has to take into account how selling a seat today in ‡uences the pro…ts it can make on the remainder of the seats. Moreover, it will have to take into account how its actions today will a¤ect the behavior of its competitors for the rest of the month. This paper analyzes competition in situations where production precedes sales and sales take place during a number of periods. As a result, the …rm operates under a multi-period capacity constraint. Any production process that involves batch production would …t this description. Other examples concern settings with costly transportation, causing stores to be supplied only every few periods. Another relevant case can be found in the …eld of exhaustible resources. Firms at the source cannot renew their supply, but have many periods to sell the resource.
We address a number of questions related to the dynamics of the market structure, the development of prices and sales over time, and the implications for pro…ts and consumer surplus. We examine the simplest situation possible: production or resource extraction has already taken place, the commodity is sold during two periods and demand is linear. Firms thereby e¤ectively face a two-period capacity constraint.
In such a multi-period setting, it becomes relevant whether or not …rms use current period outcomes before deciding upon their next period actions. We refer to these two possibilities as non-commitment versus commitment. Both the non-commitment and the commitment case are analyzed and related to one another. In the commitment setting, the strategy of a …rm speci…es the amount it is going to supply at each period. This amount does not depend on the observed sales of the competing …rm in the previous periods. In the non-commitment setting, the strategy of a …rm describes how much stock to sell in each period, conditional on observed sales in previous periods by the competing …rm. We will show that the level of commitment can have a serious in ‡uence on the results.
In the commitment case, …rms base their plan of action only on the level of initial stock of both the …rms. This case is the easiest one to analyze and in the exhaustible resource literature, this has been done so for numerous settings similar to ours. This literature starts with Hotelling (1931) . More recently, Loury (1986) , Gaudet and Van Long (1994) and Schmalensee (1980) , all …nd results that, basically, coincide with the results we …nd for the commitment setting. We establish the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It is shown that, in this equilibrium, price increases over time and as a consequence, aggregate sales decrease over time. Aggregate sales per period depend on the distribution of initial production over the …rms. Also, the …rm with more stock will never leave the market before the smaller one does.
In the setting without commitment, a …rm's supply is conditional on the amounts sold in the previous period. This makes it possible to adjust the sales path over time in response to observed sales by the competitor. Surprisingly, in the non-commitment setting, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium does not always exist. However, if an equilibrium exists, it is again unique. In equilibrium, the …rm with the larger initial production amount will never leave the market before the smaller …rm. Equilibria in the non-commitment setting may exhibit counterintuitive features. For instance, price may decrease over time and therefore aggregate sales may increase over time. In the exhaustible resource literature, Salo and Tahvonen (2001) also analyze a noncommitment setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only article in this area. Their model, however, di¤ers a lot from ours, which makes comparing results pointless.
Apart from the literature on exhaustible resources, this paper is related to those papers that analyze models with capacity constraints. Since Edgeworth (1925) , it has been widely known that per-period capacity constraints can greatly in ‡uence competition. Most of these papers, for instance Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986) , use a static setting in which …rms compete in price. More recently, several papers were written in which …rms compete in quantity and are constrained in capacity. In Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) , …rms choose their level of capacity before demand is known. After true consumers'demand is known, they compete in quantity for one period. It is shown that a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Laye and Laye (2008) analyze multi-market Cournot competition with capacity constraints. All …rms can produce a limited amount of a homogeneous product. For this product they have to choose which part they will sell at every market. In this situation, a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper in the literature that uses an intertemporal capacity constraint, is Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) . In their model, the two competing …rms have an equal …nite amount of product that they can sell in two periods. Demand is in units and growing, and …rms compete in prices. The total demand over the two periods is more than one …rm can produce, but less than both …rms can produce together. An important feature of their model is that not only the sellers, but also the buyers act strategically. One of the results is that, when there is only one consumer, linear pricing implies there is no pure strategy equilibrium. Another paper that shows some resemblance with ours is the two-period model of Saloner (1987) . In that paper, there are two periods of production, after which the goods are sold for the market clearing price.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 analyzes the equilibria that result in the commitment case. The non-commitment situation is addressed in Section 4. In Section 5, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment setting relate to the equilibrium outcomes in the noncommitment setting. Section 6 concludes. Lengthy and technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The Model
We consider two pro…t maximizing …rms that have produced (or bought) a homogeneous good. Firm i = 1; 2 therefore owns a …nite amount S i 0 of the good. Since the goods are produced beforehand, the production costs are sunk and they do not play a role in the model. With their …xed amount of stock as an upperbound, the …rms compete in quantity for two periods. A …rm may choose to have residual supply at the end of the second period. The quantities sold by …rm i in period 1 and period 2 are denoted by q i and r i , respectively, so q i + r i S i . The inverse demand each period is
where Q = q 1 + q 2 in the …rst period and Q = r 1 + r 2 in the second. 1;2 Pro…ts earned in period 2 are discounted with a factor 2 (0; 1].
Two cases are analyzed. In the …rst, …rms can commit to a sales strategy that is independent of sales by their competitor. That is, after production has taken place, both …rms unconditionally decide how much they are going to sell in each period. This implies that …rm i's strategy space is of the form i = f(q i ; r i ) 2 R 2 + j q i + r i S i g. The second case is the one of non-commitment. In this case, the amount a …rm is going to o¤er for sale in a period depends on the realized sales of its competitor in the previous period. As a result, the second-period strategy of a …rm is now the speci…cation of a sales quantity conditional on the observation of …rst-period sales. We de…ne
S i g as the set of functions that assign a feasible second-period sales quantity to every possible combination of …rst-period sales. Firm i's strategy space is i = [0; S i ] F i :
Commitment
In the commitment case …rms choose a sales path that does not depend on their competitor's realized sales. Given strategies (q 1 ; r 1 ) 2 1 and (q 2 ; r 2 ) 2 2 ; the pro…t i (q 1 ; r 1 ; q 2 ; r 2 ) of …rm i is given by
When choosing its sales path (q i ; r i ); …rm i takes the sales path (q j ; r j ) of …rm j as given, where we use the notation i and j for the two competing …rms. Firm i therefore solves the problem max q i ;r i i (q 1 ; r 1 ; q 2 ; r 2 ) subject to
The result is a best response i (q j ; r j ) 2 i given by
and q j ; r j 1
The seven cases for S i are mutually exclusive and the best responses against (q j ; r j ) are unique. The function i is continuous.
A pair of strategies (q 1 ; r 1 ; q 2 ; r 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if or, equivalently, 1 (q 2 ; r 2 ) = (q 1 ; r 1 ) and 2 (q 1 ; r 1 ) = (q 2 ; r 2 ). Given any initial combination (S 1 ; S 2 ; ), there is a unique equilibrium, as speci…ed in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1 . In the …gure, is …xed and S 1 ; S 2 are variable. A change of will not change the shape of the equilibrium areas, only the ratio between them We use the superscript 'c'to refer to equilibria in the commitment case. The two letters in the subscript represent the relative level of stock of respectively …rm i and j , where l stands for low, m for medium and h for high. In Figure 1 , also the number of active …rms in each period is indicated, where N 1 =N 2 =N r represents respectively the number of …rms that have strictly positive sales in the …rst period, the number of …rms that have strictly positive sales in the second period, and the number of …rms that have residual supply at the end of the second period. The …gure shows that the number of active …rms increases when production increases.
Parameter conditions
Period 1 Period 2 (X c ll ) When the stock of …rm 1 is low, as it is in Regions X c ll , X c lm ; and X c lh , it will sell all of its stock in the …rst period. These regions are non-empty only if the discount rate is strictly below one. The discounting of second-period pro…ts gives …rms an incentive to sell in period 1 rather than in period 2. When …rm 1 has a low stock S 1 ; then selling this entirely in the …rst period will hardly decrease the marginal revenue in the …rst period. Consequently, as long as is not too high, marginal revenue in the second period will be less than the marginal revenue in the …rst period and …rm 1 will sell its entire production in the …rst period. In Regions X c ml , X c mm ; and X c mh , …rm 1 has an intermediate amount of the commodity in stock. It then maximizes pro…t by dividing its sales over the two periods in such a way that marginal revenue in both periods is equal.
In the remaining Regions, X c hl , X c hm and X c hh , …rm 1 has a high stock and acts as if it has no capacity constraints. Firm 1 maximizes its pro…t in each period separately as to maximize total pro…t. It will have residual stock at the end of period 2.
A similar line of argumentation applies to the equilibrium strategy of …rm 2. Note that in both periods in situation X c hh …rms maximize their pro…t as if there is no capacity limit. This results in both …rms choosing their Cournot equilibrium quantities of 1 3 in both periods. The next …ve propositions describe some comparative statics results for the case with commitment. Proposition 3.1 In equilibrium, price weakly increases over time.
Proof. For any given combination of S 1 ; S 2 ; and , one can verify directly that q c 1 + q c 2 r c 1 + r c 2 . Since the aggregate sales in the …rst period weakly exceed the aggregate sales in the second period, price in the …rst period is less than or equal to the price in the second period.
Notice, in particular, that as long as its capacity doesn't prevent it from doing so, a …rm will adjust its sales to achieve equal marginal revenues in both periods. This together with a discount rate which is less than or equal to one implies that price cannot decrease over time.
Also the following proposition describes an intuitive result.
Proposition 3.2 An increase in S i leads to a weak increase in …rm i's equilibrium pro…t.
Proof. The derivative of the equilibrium pro…t function of …rm i with respect to S i is non-negative in every equilibrium outcome region and the pro…t function is continuous for all ; S i ; S j 0.
Notice, of course, that the pro…ts in Proposition 3.2 correspond to sales revenues and do not take into account the costs of production.
The next proposition studies how the relative stock sizes of the two …rms a¤ect the commodity price. For …xed aggregate stock size S 1 + S 2 , we analyze how an increase in asymmetry jS 1 S 2 j in ‡uences equilibrium outcomes. Proposition 3.3 Given …xed aggregate production S 1 + S 2 ; an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease of …rst-period aggregate equilibrium sales and therefore a weak increase of …rst-period equilibrium price. It leads (i) to a decrease of secondperiod aggregate equilibrium sales and an increase of second-period equilibrium price in Regions X c mh and X c hm and (ii) to an increase of second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a decrease of second-period equilibrium price in Regions X c lm and X c ml : It has no e¤ ect on second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the other regions.
Proof. Let S = S 1 + S 2 be …xed and assume without loss of generality that S 2 S 1 :
hh . Let Q ab be the aggregate sales in equilibrium region X ab :
For …rst-period aggregate sales, we …nd that
For second-period aggregate sales we have that
A larger di¤erence in stocks results in a higher …rst-period price. This is intuitive: consider the extreme case where one of the …rms is a monopolist, resulting in the highest possible …rst-period price. Surprisingly, the e¤ect of increasing di¤erence between the …rms' stocks on second-period prices is ambiguous. In particular, it leads to a weak decrease in second-period price in Regions X c lm and X c ml : In these regions, the smaller …rm has no stock left at the beginning of period 2. An increase in the size of the bigger …rm then simply leads to more sales by this …rm in period 2.
The following proposition studies the consequences of increased stocks for consumer surplus. Consumer surplus in the …rst period and in the second period is respectively 1 2 (q 1 + q 2 ) 2 and 1 2 (r 1 + r 2 ) 2 . To compute the total consumer surplus we have to discount the second-period consumer surplus by : Consumer surplus is therefore given by
Proposition 3.4 Equilibrium consumer surplus weakly increases if the stock of at least one of the …rms increases.
Proof. It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period sales weakly increase in S 1 and S 2 :
Since the e¤ect of an increase in jS 1 S 2 j on second-period sales is ambiguous by Proposition 3.3, it is not a priori clear how such an increase a¤ects consumer surplus. The next proposition states, nevertheless, that this e¤ect is unambiguously negative. Proposition 3.5 Given …xed aggregate stock S 1 + S 2 ; an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. Proposition 3.3 implies a weak decrease in sales in both periods when jS 1 S 2 j increases, and therefore a weak decrease in consumer surplus, except possibly in Regions X c lm and X c ml : Consider some (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) in Region X c lm or X c ml : Assume without loss of generality that S 2 S 1 ; so jS 1 S 2 j increases if S 1 decreases. Then (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X c lm : Consumer surplus is given by 1 2
where, as before, S = S 1 + S 2 . The derivative of the expression above with respect to S 1 is given by
which is easily shown to be non-negative.
By the same type of analysis, it can be shown that the results we have found for equilibrium consumer surplus coincide with the results that can be found for equilibrium total surplus. Total surplus is de…ned as the addition of consumer surplus and both the …rms'surplus. In this case, total surplus is
Equilibrium total surplus weakly increases if production by at least one of the …rms increases and, given …xed aggregate production S 1 + S 2 ; an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment case We …nd that, when …rms have the power to commit to an unconditional sales strategy, price never decreases over time. A …rm's pro…t increases when its stock increases and so does consumer surplus and total surplus. Finally, an increase in the di¤erence between the stocks of the …rms leads to lower sales in period 1 and lower consumer surplus and total surplus. The e¤ect on period 2 sales is ambiguous. 
Non-commitment
We now study the case where the sales strategy of a …rm in period 2 depends on the observed …rst-period sales. Once …rms arrive in the second period of the game, they play a one-period game with capacity constraints. We analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game. We do this by …rst analyzing the Nash equilibria of all possible period 2 subgames. Consider the subgame q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) in period 2 that results from …rst-period sales (q 1 ; q 2 ) by the …rms. Denote …rm i's second-period stock by
as …rm i's best response function in subgame q. Given sales r j by …rm j; …rm i solves the problem
The best response for …rm i in period 2 is then given by
Quantities (r 1 ; r 2 ) are a Nash equilibrium of the second-period subgame q if and only if 1q (r 2 ) = r 1 and 2q (r 1 ) = r 2 . Each subgame q has a unique Nash equilibrium as speci…ed in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 2 .
In Region Y hh , both …rms have su¢ cient residual stock in the second period to choose their unconstrained pro…t maximizing sales quantity. In Regions Y hl and Y lh , only one …rm is restricted by its residual stock, respectively …rm 1 and …rm 2. In Region Y ll both …rms are restricted by their residual stock and sell in the second period all they have left.
The equilibrium action chosen by …rm i in period 2 is given by the function f i de…ned by
We now replace the second-period subgames by the second-period outcomes as induced by f : The result is a one-period reduced game with payo¤s given by It follows that the reduced pro…t function of …rm i is given by
A pair of strategies (q 1 ; q 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if it holds that
A Nash equilibrium (q 1 ; q 2 ) of the reduced game corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (q 1 ; f 1 ; q 2 ; f 2 ) of the complete game and vice versa. Lemma 4.1 q i ; q j 1 2 for any Nash equilibrium (q 1 ; q 2 ) of the reduced game.
Proof. The …rst-period pro…t is q i (1 q i q j ); which is strictly decreasing in q i if
If …rm i decreases its …rst-period sales, it increases its second-period stock. As can be seen in Table 2 , …rm i's second-period pro…t never decreases when its second-period stock increases. Consequently, …rm i strictly increases its pro…ts if it sets
Using the reduced pro…t function (2), we determine the reduced best responses, denoting by R i (q j ) the reduced best response of …rm i against q j . Appendix A provides the computational details. Given q j ; the reduced pro…t function is not always concave, though it is continuous. As a consequence, the reduced best response against q j does always exist, but may not be unique. We therefore have a reduced best response correspondence rather than a reduced best response function. This correspondence may fail to be convex-valued though it is upper hemi-continuous. The reduced best response correspondence of …rm i is presented in Appendix A. Quantities (q 1 ; q 2 ) are a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game if and only if q i 2
The Nash equilibria of the reduced game, and thereby the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game of interest, are calculated in Appendix B. Since the reduced best response correspondences are not convex-valued, it is not guaranteed that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists. Indeed, it turns out that for some combinations of S i ; S j and a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium fails to exist.
The set of exogenous variables (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) can be partitioned in 11 regions. In each region, the equilibria share the same qualitative features and are di¤erentiable functions of S 1 ; S 2 ; and . The equilibrium regions are given in Table 3 Table 3 also shows the equilibrium outcomes. We use the superscript 'nc'to refer to equilibria in the non-commitment case. The two letters in the subscript represent the relative level of stock of respectively …rm i and j , where l stands for low, m for medium, m'for medium-high and h for high.
As is illustrated by Figure 3 for = 1=2; the 11 regions are mutually exclusive. This property is generally true, leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2
There is at most one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for every combination of S 1 ; S 2 ; and .
Proof. It follows from comparing the constraints in Table 3 , that all regions are disjoint. Therefore, every combination of S i ; S j and belongs to at most one equilibrium region. The Nash equilibrium of the reduced game is therefore unique for (S i ; S j ; ) in Regions X nc ll up to and including X nc hh : The reduced game has no Nash equilibrium for (S i ; S j ; ) belonging to Region X nc Ø : Nash equilibria for the reduced Parameter conditions
All other values of (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) No equilibrium Explanation of the symbols Table 3 : Equilibria in the non-commitment case.
game are in a one to one relationship with subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the complete game.
In some cases an equilibrium does not exist.
Corollary 4.3 For every , there is a set of stock levels (S 1 ; S 2 ) with non-empty interior for which an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. It can be veri…ed that for each ; the set of stock pro…les (S 1 ; S 2 ) such that (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X nc Ø has a non-empty interior. Figure 3 gives an overview of the dynamic development of the market structure, where again N 1 =N 2 =N r represents the number of …rms that sell the commodity in the …rst period, the number of …rms that sell the commodity in the second period, and the number of …rms that have residual stock by the end of the second period. Just as in the non-commitment case, the number of active …rms increases when initial production levels increase.
Some of the regions in the non-commitment case coincide with those in the case with commitment. This holds speci…cally for the Regions X nc ll , X nc lm , X nc ml , X nc lh , X nc hl , X nc mm ; and X nc hh . 3 For these regions, the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment and in the non-commitment case are equivalent.
In the commitment case, the price never decreases from period 1 to period 2. The reason is that a decreasing price would make it pro…table for a …rm to transfer some of its sales from period 2 to period 1. This line of reasoning does not hold when there is no commitment. Indeed, in the non-commitment case a transfer of sales from period 2 to period 1 may trigger a reaction by the competing …rm, which renders such a transfer unpro…table, even when the price in period 1 is higher than in period 2. 
hm' with non-empty interior such that the equilibrium price strictly decreases over time. In particular, the equilibrium price strictly decreases over time if and only if S i < S j and 2 2 3 2 S i < 2 3 1 9 ;
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, price never decreases over time in the commitment situation. Price decreases in the non-commitment case are therefore only possible in regions where the non-commitment case is di¤erent from the case with commitment, i.e. Regions X nc mh ; X nc hm ; X nc m'h ; and X nc hm' : In these regions, one …rm has an intermediate and one …rm has a high stock level. Let i be the intermediate …rm and let j be the large …rm. In Regions X nc mh and X nc hm it holds that 1 3 (1 ) < S i 2 3 1 9 ;
The total quantity sold in the …rst period is
The total quantity sold in the second period is
The price strictly decreases from period 1 to period 2 when 4+ +2 S i < 3S i +2+3 ; so when S i > 2 2 3 2 . In Regions X nc m'h and X nc hm' we have 2 3
, in this region, price strictly decreases from period one to period two whenever S i 6 = Proposition 4.4 makes clear that price may decrease over time in the non-commitment case. This can happen for the following reason. In the settings where price decreases over time, the larger …rm reacts in both periods -unrestricted by its stock -per-period optimal to the sales of the smaller …rm. Since the smaller …rm has a stock less than 1=3 in the second period, the larger …rm cannot deviate in the …rst period in such a way that the smaller …rm will lower its second-period sales. This implies that the larger …rm cannot increase pro…ts by deviating. The smaller …rm, just as in the commitment case, might want to transfer some of its sales from the second to the …rst period. However, in the non-commitment situation, if the smaller …rm transfers sales from period 2 to period 1, there will be a response by the larger …rm. The larger …rm reacts to this transfer by increasing its second-period sales, causing the second-period price to fall. Therefore, the second-period pro…ts of the smaller …rm drop. The decrease in pro…ts in the second period outweigh the increase in pro…ts in the …rst period. This makes transferring sales from the second-period to the …rst not worth the while for the smaller …rm.
In the commitment case, an increase in a …rm's stock leads to an increase in pro…ts. Is this property still true in the non-commitment case? It is easily shown, with the help of the derivatives of the equilibrium pro…ts, that within each region pro…t rises when a …rm's stock level increases. Moreover, the pro…t function is continuous on the domain of (S i ; S j ; ) for which an equilibrium exists. However, it is still possible for the pro…t to decrease when a …rm's stock level increases, namely when a small increase in stock level leads to non-existence of equilibrium. The next proposition con…rms that such decreases in pro…t may occur for speci…c parameter values. That is, equilibria may not be "destroy-proof". Proposition 4.5 An increase in S i , ceterus paribus, leads to a weak increase of the equilibrium pro…t of …rm i, as long as the increase doesn't change the equilibrium outcome region. If an increase in S i does change the equilibrium outcome region, there are combinations of S i ; S j and such that an increase in S i leads to a strict decrease in equilibrium pro…t of …rm i.
Proof. The derivative of the equilibrium pro…t function with respect to S i is nonnegative in every equilibrium region. The non-existence of an equilibrium for some combinations of (S i ; S j ; ) makes it possible that a strict increase in S i leads to a strict decrease in the equilibrium pro…t of …rm i. Take = 0:2; S j = 0:69824; and
These parameters correspond to a point on the upper boundary of Region X nc mm . The equilibrium pro…t for …rm i equals 0:12937: We now let S i increase to
Our parameters now belong to Region X nc mh . The equilibrium pro…t for …rm i equals 0:12751:
We now study the consequences of increasing di¤erence in stock size on sales. Proposition 4.6 Given …xed aggregate stock S 1 +S 2 ; an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease in …rst-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a weak increase of …rst-period equilibrium price. It leads to a decrease in second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and an increase in second-period equilibrium price in Regions X c mh and X c hm and to an increase in second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and a decrease in secondperiod equilibrium price in Regions X c lm and X c ml : It has no e¤ ect on second-period aggregate equilibrium sales and equilibrium price in the other regions.
Between Regions X nc mm and X nc mh there is no equilibrium. Consider an increase in S 1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S 2 that leads to a move from Region X nc mh to Region X nc mm : It holds that Q nc mm coincides with Q c mm and
The desired result for this case now follows from Proposition 3.3.
Between Regions X nc m'h and X nc mm there is no equilibrium. Consider an increase in S 1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S 2 that leads to a move from Region X nc m'h to Region X nc mm : Again, it holds that Q nc mm coincides with Q c mm ; Region X nc m'h is a subset of Region X c mh ; and
where S 1 2=3 is used to derive the inequality sign. The desired result for this case now follows from Proposition 3.3. For second-period aggregate sales we have that
Between Regions X nc mm and X nc mh there is no equilibrium. For this region, the consequences of increasing disparity of initial stock on second-period aggregate sales haven't been discussed yet. Consider an increase in S 1 together with a decrease of the same magnitude in S 2 that leads to a move from Region X nc mh to Region X nc mm : The second-period equilibrium sales may both decrease and increase, depending on the values of S 1 ; S 2 ; and : For instance, when S 1 = 5=9; S 2 = 3=4; and = 1; we are in Region X nc mh and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 2=3: After an increase in S 1 accompanied by a decrease in S 2 of the same magnitude resulting in S 1 = S 2 = 47=72; we are in Region X nc mm and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 47=72 < 2=3: We now make the same calculations for a discount rate equal to 1=2: When (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) = (5=9; 3=4; 1=2) we are in Region X nc mh and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 13=24; whereas at (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) = (47=72; 47=72; 1=2) we are in Region X nc mm and the aggregate second-period sales are equal to 35=54 > 13=24: There is also no equilibrium between Regions X nc mm and X nc m'h : An increase in S 1 together with a decrease of the same size in S 2 that leads from Region X nc m'h to Region X nc mm will univocally lead to a decrease in second-period sales. Indeed, since in Region X nc mm we have S 1 + S 2 4=3; we have that
Analogous results hold for comparative statics involving Regions X nc mm and X nc hm ; and Regions X nc mm and X nc hm' : We next evaluate the e¤ect of an increase in stock on consumer surplus. We use the same measure for consumer surplus as before.
Proposition 4.7 An increase in S i , ceterus paribus, leads to a weak increase in equilibrium consumer surplus, as long as the increase doesn't change the equilibrium outcome region. For some combinations of S i ; S j and , a strict increase in S i does change the equilibrium outcome region. This can lead to a strict decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. It follows directly from the equilibrium outcomes that per-period sales in every equilibrium outcome region weakly increase in S 1 and S 2 . However, take ; S i ; S 0 That is, just like the …rms, consumers usually gain from an increase in stock. There are settings in which consumers are better o¤ if a …rm does not increase its stock. However, this can only happen if, for some stock levels in between the old and new stock level of the …rm, ceterus paribus, an equilibrium doesn't exist.
The in ‡uence of increasing di¤erence in stock level on consumer surplus is given in the following proposition. Proposition 4.8 Given …xed aggregate stock S 1 + S 2 , an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. By Proposition 3.5, this proposition holds for jS 1 S 2 j; as long as (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) = 2
Assume, without loss of generality, that S 2 S 1 , so jS 1 S 2 j increases if S 1 decreases. Proposition 4.6 implies a weak decrease in sales in both periods when jS 1 S 2 j increases, and therefore a weak decrease in consumer surplus, for Region X nc m'h and X nc mh . The remaining cases to check are those where a decrease in S 1 changes the equilibrium outcome from a point in X nc mm to a point in X nc mh or from X nc mm to X nc m'h . The last part of this section is, again, devoted to total surplus. We have already seen that an increase in a …rm's stock can lead to a decrease in its equilibrium pro…t and in consumer surplus. It will not come as a surprise that, with some extra calculations, the same type of results can be found for total surplus. If an increase in stock of one of the …rms doesn't change the equilibrium outcome region, equilibrium total surplus increases with this increase in stock. If an increase in stock of one of the …rms does change the equilibrium outcome region, for some combinations of variables, this leads to a decrease in total surplus. And, given …xed aggregate stock S 1 + S 2 ; an increase in jS 1 S 2 j leads to a weak decrease in equilibrium total surplus.
Summary of comparative statics results for the non-commitment case
In this section we have found that there is at most one subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each combination of S i ; S j and . In contrast to the commitment situation, in the case without commitment it is possible that the equilibrium price decreases over time and that a …rm's pro…t increases when it produces less. Increasing disparity in …rm size leads to higher …rst-period equilibrium prices and lower sales, but has ambiguous e¤ects on second-period equilibrium prices. Within every equilibrium outcome region, an increase in some …rm's production level leads to an increase in it's pro…t, an increase in consumer surplus and an increase in total surplus. However, there are situations in which an increase in some …rm's production level can lead to a decrease in its pro…ts, a decrease in consumer surplus and/or a decrease in total surplus.
Commitment versus Non-commitment
In this section, we analyze how the equilibrium outcomes of the commitment setting are related to the equilibrium outcomes of the non-commitment case.
For certain regions, as was mentioned before, the equilibrium outcomes coincide. Notice that the equilibrium outcome corresponds to equilibrium sales by the two …rms in both periods.
Proposition 5.1 For every (S
hh ; the equilibrium sales in the non-commitment case coincide with those of the commitment setting.
Proof. From the constraints de…ning the various regions it follows that
The equilibrium sales in Regions X nc ll ; X nc lm ; X nc ml ; X nc lh ; X nc hl ; X nc mm ; and X nc hh coincide with the equilibrium sales in Region X c ll ; X c lm ; X c ml ; X c lh ; X c hl ; X c mm ; and X c hh ; respectively.
An equilibrium always exists when S 1 = S 2 . Since, for these production levels,
hh when there is no commitment and (S 1 ;
hh when there is commitment, the following corollary follows.
Corollary 5.2 When …rms 1 and 2 are symmetric, the equilibrium sales in the commitment case coincide with those of the non-commitment setting.
The equivalence in equilibrium outcomes no longer holds when
In these cases, there is one …rm of intermediate size, and one …rm that can react almost unrestrictedly to the quantities of its competitor. In the following we refer to these …rms as the intermediate …rm and the large …rm, respectively. We show that the large …rm gains and the intermediate …rm loses from being in the non-commitment case, whenever we are not in Region X nc Ø ; i.e. whenever a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists in the non-commitment case. Proposition 5.3 For every (S 1 ; S 2; ) outside Region X nc Ø ; the change in equilibrium outcome from the commitment case to the non-commitment case is to the advantage of the larger …rm and to the disadvantage of the smaller …rm.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that S 2 S 1 : Whenever there is a change in the equilibrium outcome, it holds that (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X c mh : Firm 2 has pro…ts equal to
It also holds that (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X nc mh or Region X nc m'h . In Region X nc mh ; …rm 2 has pro…ts equal to
In Region X nc m'h the pro…ts of …rm 2 are equal to
We have that S 1 2 3 in all these regions, from which it follows that nc 2 c 2 : Analogous calculations show the opposite relation for the pro…ts of …rm 1.
The intuition for this proposition follows from the same line of reasoning as that of Proposition 4.4. The total quantity sold is, in both the settings, the same for each …rm. The small …rm sells all of its stock in two periods, whereas the large …rm reacts per-period optimal. The small …rm sells more of its stock in the …rst period commitment setting than in the …rst period non-commitment setting and for the large …rm it is the other way around. Price is higher in the …rst period non-commitment setting than in the …rst period commitment setting (see Proposition 5.4). For the second period, it is the other way around again. Therefore, the large …rm makes more pro…t and the small …rm makes less pro…t in the non-commitment setting, compared to the commitment setting. The small …rm cannot change this by selling more of its stock in the …rst period, since this will induce the large …rm to sell extra in the second period, thereby making this deviation unpro…table.
The following proposition describes the consequences of commitment for equilibrium prices and sales.
Proposition 5.4 For every (S 1 ; S 2; ) outside Region X nc Ø ; the …rst-period equilibrium price in the non-commitment case is greater than or equal to the …rst-period equilibrium price in the commitment case and the second-period equilibrium price in the non-commitment case is less than or equal to the second-period equilibrium price in the commitment setting. The opposite relationships hold for aggregate sales in the two periods.
Proof. We assume without loss of generality that S 2 S 1 . Whenever there is a change in the equilibrium price, (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X c mh : In Region X c mh , prices in the …rst and second period are respectively It also holds that (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X nc mh or X nc m'h . In Region X nc mh , prices are The equilibrium outcome in the commitment case does not always coincide with the equilibrium outcome in the non-commitment setting, in particular when there is one intermediate and one large …rm. In these cases, it is the intermediate …rm that would deviate if the commitment equilibrium quantities were chosen in the non-commitment setting. By transferring some of its quantity from the …rst to the second period, the intermediate …rm could improve its pro…t, knowing that it forces the bigger …rm to adjust its second-period quantity downwards. This opportunity to deviate pro…tably leads to the non-existence of an equilibrium in Region X nc Ø : In Regions X nc mh , X nc hm , X nc m'h ; and X nc hm' , the pro…table deviation of the intermediate …rm results in a change in the equilibrium outcome. Perhaps surprisingly, the equilibrium outcomes change to the disadvantage of the intermediate …rm. To avoid a deviation by the intermediate …rm, in the non-commitment case the large …rm sets a higher …rst-period quantity than in the commitment case. This increase in sales by the large …rm is more than o¤set by lower …rst-period sales by the intermediate …rm. The …rst-period equilibrium price is higher in the non-commitment case than in the commitment setting. The intermediate …rm still sells all its production, leading to a strong increase in its second-period sales. The second-period equilibrium price is lower in the non-commitment case than in the commitment setting. The large …rm reacts per-period optimal to the intermediate …rms and has the same total sales as before. It follows that the pro…t for the intermediate …rm is lower in the non-commitment setting than in the commitment setting, whilst it is the other way around for the large …rm.
Regarding consumer surplus, we mention the following. One may expect the ability to commit to lead to less competition in the commitment setting than in the case without commitment. However, this only holds for some settings in which future pro…ts are hardly discounted. The non-commitment setting gives the large …rm more opportunity to use its power, which, as a result, increases the …rst period price and decreases the second period price. Due to discounting, in most cases this results in consumer surplus being lower in the non-commitment setting than in the case with commitment.
Proposition 5.5 For every (S 1 ; S 2 ; ), such that (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) = 2 X nc Ø and 24 25 , consumers prefer the commitment setting over the non-commitment setting. If > 24 25 , there are combinations of (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) for which consumers prefer the non-commitment setting.
Proof. We assume, without loss of generality, that S 2 S 1 . Whenever there is a change in consumer surplus between the settings, (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X c mh ; and to Region X nc mh or X nc m'h : Consumer surplus in Regions X c mh , X nc mh and X nc m'h is respectively
For Region X nc mh and X nc m'h , it holds respectively that The smaller …rm prefers the commitment setting, the larger …rm prefers the noncommitment setting and consumers prefer in most situations the commitment setting. Which setting then maximizes total surplus is the question yet to answer. Proposition 5.6 Total surplus is higher in the commitment setting than in the noncommitment setting.
Proof. We again assume w.l.o.g. that S 2 S 1 . Whenever there is a change in total surplus between the commitment and the non-commitment setting, (S 1 ; S 2 ; ) belongs to Region X c mh ; and to Region X nc mh or X nc m'h : Total surplus in Regions X c mh , X nc mh and X nc m'h is respectively
For Region X nc hm and Region X nc hm' , it holds respectively that 
], total surplus is the highest in the commitment setting. Summary of comparative statics results for the commitment versus the non-commitment case The following can be said about the equilibrium outcome regions. There is no di¤er-ence between the equilibrium outcomes in the commitment and the non-commitment case if the …rms are of equal size. Non-commitment is preferred over commitment only by the larger of the two …rms. When there is no commitment, the …rst-period equilibrium price is higher and the second-period equilibrium price is lower than in the case with commitment. Consumer surplus is in most cases highest in the commitment setting and total surplus is in all cases highest in the commitment setting.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that whether …rms can or cannot commit to their sales strategy in ‡uences prices, sales quantities, pro…ts and surplus. Comparative statics in the case with commitment conform to standard intuition. In the non-commitment situation, however, a number of counterintuitive results were found. First, equilibria may fail to exist. Moreover, in equilibrium prices may decrease over time and higher stocks can lead to lower revenues from sales. Large …rms bene…t from the absence of commitment, contrary to small …rms and, in most cases, consumers.
We have limited the analysis to the case where competition takes place during two periods. We expect our main results to be true in the multi-period setting as well, but we fail to have an analytically tractable model speci…cation for that situation.
We have only analyzed the case where production has already taken place, and …rms compete in sales strategies. Such an assumption is valid if the capacity choice is a long-run decision that is not altered easily, as is the case for instance in the example of airplane companies mentioned in the introduction. An extension of the model could be to make the production capacity choice of the …rms endogenous, if, again, the tractability issues can be overcome.
Another issue that should be addressed in future research is to what extent the choice for quantity competition a¤ects our outcomes. It is natural to address the questions of this paper for models of price competition. Also here, however, it is not easy to …nd a model speci…cation that is su¢ ciently general but still analytically tractable.
Appendix A The Reduced Best Response Correspondence
We derive the reduced best response correspondence of …rm i for the non-commitment case. To keep the appendix within reasonable length, we have omitted the derivation of second-order conditions. In accordance with Proposition 4.1, we can restrict our analysis to best responses against q j 1 2 . We distinguish three cases:
These three cases correspond to the three cases of residual stock T j = S j q j of …rm j with qualitatively di¤erent second-period behavior of …rm j:
Using the reduced pro…t function (2), for 0 q i < S i It follows from the reduced pro…t function (2) that, for 0 q i < S i 
Since S j q j 1=3; it holds that maxf S lh i ; S ll i g 5=6 q j =2: To …nd the global maximum, we compare the pro…ts in both local maxima. The pro…ts corresponding to q lh i and q ll i are respectively
It holds that lh i ll i if and only if S i S i , wherẽ
:
1 2 q j we have a boundary solution, and pro…t maximizing sales are given by q i = S i 1 3 . One possibility remains: maxf S lh i ;S i g < S i S ll i . In this case, the pro…t maximizing choice is either q ll i or q i : We argue that q ll i maximizes pro…ts, so for S lh i S i S ll i ; the best response of …rm i is q ll i .
It holds that
if and only if
we have our desired conclusion. Summarizing, the reduced best response q i of player i against q j for S j 1 2
is given by
; if maxfS
; if maxfS i ; S 
It follows from the reduced pro…t function (2) that, for 0 q i < S i (1 q j + T j );
We therefore …nd that the reduced best response q i of player 1 to q j is given by
6.1 The reduced best response correspondence Table 4 now follows immediately.
Appendix B Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We de…ne the sets A j (1); : : : ; A j (4); B j (1); : : : ; B j (7); C j (1); : : : ; C j (4) as the sets of quantities q j satisfying the constraints as presented in Table 4 . Notice that each of these sets is a subset of [0; 1=2]: Moreover, we de…ne A j (k 1 ; : : :
; and similarly for sets B j (k 1 ; : : : ; k`) and C j (k 1 ; : : : ; k`): In the proofs we will make use of Table 4 . That table presents the reduced best response of …rm i to a …rst-period sales quantity of …rm j with the use of coe¢ cients 1 ; : : : ; 8 : In the sequel we will need the reduced best response of …rm j to a …rst-period sales quantity of …rm i; which follows from Table 4 by reversing the roles of …rm i and j: The corresponding coe¢ cients are denoted by 1 ; : : : ; 8 :
Proposition B.1 If (q i ; q j ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and q j 2 A j (1; 2; 3) [ B j (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) [ C j (1), then S i q i 1 3 ; so q i 2 C i (1; 2; 3; 4): Table 4 that
where the inequality follows from q j 2 : For q j 2 B j (2); where the …rst inequality follows from 5 < q j 1 2 and the second one from 1 and S j > q j + 1 3 1 3 : For q j 2 B j (3),
where the …rst inequality follows from q j 6 (i.e. S i S c i ), the second from 
where the …rst inequality follows from q j 7 , i.e. S i S ll i ; and the second one from
Proposition B.2 If (q i ; q j ) is a Nash equilibrium of the reduced game and q j 2
(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7).
, then since q j > 3 ; we have S i > 5 6 1 2 q j ; and
We continue by solving for all Nash equilibria (q i ; q j ) of the reduced game where q j 2 A j (1): Next we consider Nash equilibria (q i ; q j ) with q j 2 A j (2): We restrict attention to the case with q i = 2 A i (1); since using the symmetry of the …rms such equilibria follow already from the …rst case. We continue with q j 2 A j (3); and so on.
It holds that
By Proposition B.1, q i 2 C i (1; 2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
q i 2 C i (4) :
by (5) and Lemma 4.1, so (3) leads to a contradiction.
Next, (3) and (6) imply
and S j > 8 : These inequalities together with the inequalities (3) and (4) lead to the conclusion that (q j ; q i ) is a Nash equilibrium with q j 2 A j (1) if and only if q j = q j 2 A j (2)
By Proposition B.1, q i 2 C i (2; 3; 4). 4 This gives the following possibilities:
, and (8) leads to a contradiction. Consider q i 2 C i (3): It holds that
where the …rst inequality follows from (8) and (11), and the second inequality from S j 8 : By rewriting the expression in (13), it follows that S i < 1 3 1 3 : However, this is contradicted by
where the …rst inequality follows from (9) and (11) , and the second inequality from S j 8 : Consider q i 2 C i (4). It is implied by (9) and (12) that
From (8) and (12) it follows that S j > 5+5 2 S i 6+4
. In conclusion, (q j ; q i ) is a Nash equilibrium with q j 2 A j (2) if and only if q j = 2+3 2 S i 6+4
By Proposition B.1, q i 2 C i (2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities:
Consider q i 2 C i (2): Since q j = 0; the second inequality in (15) implies S i 5 6 : We have that
where the …rst inequality follows from (14) and the second from q i > 5 : By rewriting the expression (16), we …nd that S i > where both inequalities follow from (15). From (14), it follows that
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, q j 2 A j (3) if and only if q i 2 C i (4); S j > q j 2 A j (4)
We have
By Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, q i 2 A i (4) [ B i (7) . 5 This gives the following possibilities:
. It follows from (17) that
The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, q j 2 A j (4) if and only if q i 2 A i (4) [ B i (7) and S j > q j 2 B j (1)
5 Note that Proposition B.1 excludes that q i 2 Ai(1; 2; 3) [ Bi(1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6) and q j 2 Aj(4). q j 2 B j (2)
We have where the …rst inequality follows from (21) and the second one from S j > 8 .
In conclusion, q j = 2 B j (2):
It holds that 
By Proposition B.1, q i 2 C i (2; 3; 4). This gives the following possibilities: Consider q i 2 C i (4). By S j > 8 and (23) it follows that 2 2S j < S i 7+10 +3 2 6S j 10 S j 4 2 S j +(5+9 6S j 8 S j ) q (1+ )(1+ . Now, there only exists an S i such that 2 2S j < S i 5+9 6S j 8 S j 4
, if S j < 5+ 6 ; a contradiction. In conclusion, q j 2 B j (3) if and only if q i 2 C i (3) and . However, no such S j exists, since this would imply that S i < 1 ( 1 +
2 ) 0. Consider q i 2 C i (3). It follows from (26) and q i < 5 that
3 -6S j -9 S j -3 2 S j +(5+2 + 2 -6S j -2 S j ) q (1+ )(1+ 
and from (25) and q i < 5 that
There exists an S i such that (28) if and only if S j > . The other constraints are redundant. In conclusion, q j 2 B j (4) if and only if q i 2 C i (4) and S i ;(31) q j 2S i 3 + 4S j + 3 S j 3 + 3 :
q i 2 C i (2) : q i = 1 + 2 S i + S j 2 + 2 ; q j = 0; q i 2 C i (3) : q i = 1 + 3 S i 3 + 3 ; q j = 1 + 3 S j 3 + 3 ; q i 2 C i (4) : q i = 1 3 + 4 S i + 2 S j 3 + 3 ;
q j = 1 + 3 2 S i S j 3 + 3 :
For q i 2 C i (2), it follows from q i > 6 that S j < q j 2 C j (2)
It holds that q j S j 1 3 ;
We have q j 2 C j (3)
We have q j 2 C j (4)
This case does not need to be calculated here, since, by proposition B.2, it can only be combined with the situations A i and B i , and all these situations are already calculated.
